In this article we consider the prohibition on the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis to select an embryo on the basis of its sex for non-medical reasons. We use this as a case study to explore the role that public consultations have and should play in ethico-legal decision making. Until the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 was amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, non-medical sex selection of an embryo was not statutorily regulated but it was the policy of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority that such selection should not occur. However, since 2009 it has been a criminal offence to select an embryo on the basis of its sex for non-medical reasons. We consider the reasons given for this change and explore the role that 'public opinion' had in the decisionmaking process. On the face of it, asking the public what they think seems reasonable, fair and democratic, and those who are not in favour of public consultations being accorded great weight in matters of policy may appear out of touch and as wanting to impose their moral views on the public at large. But there are problems with doing so, especially when seeking to regulate ethically controversial issues. We discuss whether regulation should be influenced by public opinion obtained via 'public consultations', and utilise sex selection for non-medical reasons as an example of how (apparently) public opinion was used to support the criminalisation of this practice.
Technology Committee published a report on human reproduction, which included sex edn, para 7.21 (any reason); HFEA, Code, 5 th edn, para 9.10 (any reason); HFEA, Code, 7 th edn, G.8.7.2 (any reason). However, the most recent Code permits sperm sorting for medical reasons provided the patient receives information about the 'process, procedures, possible risks and the experience of the clinic in doing the procedure' (HFEA, Code, 8 th edn, para 10.20), but gradient methods should not be used for medical reasons because of the technique's unreliability (para.10.19). 19 HFEA, Code, 6 th edn, n 18 above, Part 14. Subsequently, HFEA, Code, 7 th edn, n 18 above, G.12, Appendix A A.13.7-A13.9; HFEA, Code, 8 th edn, n 18 above, Sections 9-10. 20 23 Note that selecting an embryo on the basis of its sex for 'social reasons' is prohibited under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997. This Convention has not been signed or ratified by the UK.
HFEA's Code of Practice that licensed clinics may not use information derived from tests on an embryo or material removed from it to select embryos of a particular sex for non-medical reasons. 25 The Department of Health conducted a review of and public consultation on the 1990 Act in 2005, including the use and regulation of sex selection. 26 A White Paper was published in December 2006 in which it was said that 'the Government believes that there is a general desire for the law to be clearer on [screening and selecting embryos], and hence for Parliament to define some limits or criteria that apply to testing of embryos'. 27 In May 2007 a draft bill was published which included a statutory prohibition on selecting an embryo on the basis of sex for non-medical reasons, 28 and a Joint Parliamentary Committee was appointed to scrutinise it. The Committee recommended that sex selection for non-medical reasons was not permitted, was concerned that the wording in the draft bill was more restrictive than current HFEA policy, and recommended that the bill was amended in line with that policy. 29 The Government accepted that recommendation, 30 In just under 15 years the regulation of sex selection for non-medical reasons has shifted from guidance that clinics 'must not', 39 'are expected not to', 40 or 'should not' 41 perform it, to a criminal prohibition on using PGD for these reasons. This change merits investigation because, in general, the 2008 Act's amendments to the original 1990 Act were more permissive in nature, including removing the requirement to consider the child's need for a father and introducing, in essence, a presumption to treat unless 'significant harm or neglect' is predicted. 42 In contrast, using PGD to identify an embryo's sex for non-medical reasons was subject to more prohibitive treatment. there should be a presumption towards providing treatment to those who request it, but that treatment should be refused in cases where clinics conclude that the child to be born, or any existing child of the family, is likely to suffer serious harm.
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In deciding whether to treat, the current Code focuses on 'factors that are likely to cause a risk of significant harm or neglect to any child who may be born or to any existing child of the family'. 53 These include any 'aspect' of their (and/or their partner's) 'past or current circumstances that may lead to any [existing or to-be born] child … experiencing serious physical or psychological harm or neglect', referring to previous convictions relating to children, any child protection measures, or 'violence or serious discord in the family environment'. 54 Past or current circumstances which might indicate an 'inability to care' for an existing child or one to-be-born will also be considered, including addiction problems, 50 N Gamble, 'Considering the need for a father: medical history, or 'circumstances that the centre considers likely to cause serious harm to any child mentioned above'. 55 Thus, apart from the latter factor, the Code now appears to focus decisions about whether particular individuals or couples should be provided with treatment on evidence that serious harm will befall existing or to-be-born children as a result of that treatment being provided.
In line with this general adherence to the harm principle as a guide to regulation in this area, in 2003 the HFEA stated that:
[t]he main argument against prohibiting sex selection for non-medical reasons is that it concerns that most intimate aspect of family life, the decision to have children.
This is an area of private life in which people are generally best left to make their own choices and in which the State should intervene only to prevent the occurrence of serious harms, and only where this intervention is non-intrusive and likely to be effective.
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Indeed, the HFEA is generally committed to the democratic or liberal presumption that individual choices, in this case reproductive choices, should only be interfered with in order to prevent serious harm to others, and many of the provisions of the amended 1990 Act reflect this. 57 On this basis, it would seem that the only reason for prohibiting non-medical sex selection would be because it is thought to cause serious harm. 55 Ibid, emphasis supplied. 56 HFEA, n 47, para 132, emphasis supplied. For criticism of this report see, for eg., J Harris, 'Sex selection and regulated hatred ' (2005) welfare of the child would be whether this child is likely to suffer serious physical or psychological harm, although such harm would be unlikely to blight that life completely. As we have noted, considerations such as 'commitment to raise children', their 'ability to provide a stable and supportive environment for a child/children', and their 'age, health and ability to provide for the needs of a child/children', 60 were considered important when assessing the likely welfare of the resultant child, even though failures to reach optimal levels of commitment, supportive environments or the health of the would-be parents would be unlikely to create a child who has a life we might consider not worth living or a harm in itself.
The amended Act and updated Code raise the threshold to an assumption of treatment unless there is evidence that serious harm will befall the resultant child. However, it is still not clear that this consideration is restricted to only those rare cases where lives are likely to be completely blighted by suffering. Deciding which of these senses of serious harm should be adopted when considering the welfare of children born following assisted reproduction is important, but it is not our focus here. 61 Instead, concern for the welfare of the future child on the basis of (serious) harm cannot be a reason to prohibit sex selection for non-medical reasons because there is no evidence that using PGD for these reasons will lead to either kind of serious harm to the welfare of the future child. Indeed, in its report on sex selection, the HFEA offered no evidence to support its conclusion that selection for non-medical reasons should be prohibited because of hypothetical risks to the welfare of a sex-selected child and its family, other than the concerns expressed in the public consultation, as we discuss in Without such evidence it is only possible to posit the harm that might be caused by using PGD to select an embryo on the basis of its sex for non-medical reasons, but not for medical reasons? It is possible that allowing parents to select to implant an embryo of a particular sex may cause the child some psychological difficulties or pressures as a result, but similar pressures that may be exerted on other children not selected in this way. It is hard to imagine these difficulties being so serious that they would cause the selected children harm, let alone harm so serious that it would obliterate the positive attributes that life has brought them.
Parents who select the sex of their child in this way may be overbearing or have a particular idea of the sort of child they wish to have. Perhaps they want a child who will be a ballerina or a rugby player and hope that sex selection will help them reach this goal. However, many children have overbearing parents, parents who have strong ideas about how their children's lives should go and this may make us feel sorry for these children and try and remonstrate with their parents. But it is unlikely to make us feel that allowing these parents to create 63 House of Commons, n 24 above, para 272, emphasis supplied. 64 House of Commons, n 24 above, para 142, emphasis supplied. Also, Recommendation 30. 65 House of Commons, n 24 above, para 140, emphasis supplied. Also, Recommendation 29. 66 House of Commons, n 24 above, para 139, emphasis supplied.
these children in this environment, in the only environment they could have been created, was a wicked and deplorable act. This is particularly as the children are as likely to value their lives as any other children. Indeed, children born as a result of using PGD to select sex for non-medical reasons may have what might be considered a sub-optimal life, but their life is as likely as any other to be one that they value overall. So, whatever view we take on what is meant by serious harm, it is difficult to see how a concern to protect future children from that harm can justify the prohibition on sex selection for non-medical reasons.
While children born as a result of using PGD to select sex for non-medical reasons may have what might considered to be a sub-optimal life, their life is as likely as any other to be one that they value overall. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how sex selection for non-medical reasons is likely to cause serious harm to the individual born as a result of this selection process. In fact, it is difficult to distinguish using PGD for these reasons from using PGD generally or for medical reasons with regard to avoiding serious harm and protecting the welfare of the resulting child, and also regarding the benefits they may produce. With regard to medical reasons, only a minority of cases will involve the avoidance of catastrophic disorder, a condition that is likely to completely blight that life and make it unworthwhile.
Most cases of medical sex selection using PGD will be motivated by a desire to avoid serious disorders which are unlikely to render lives not worth living; for example, haemophilia, muscular dystrophy or Turner Syndrome. Thus, where medical sex selection is sanctioned, the choice may be between two worthwhile lives. If PGD is used to avoid a sex linked disorder and a child is born with a disorder that is unlikely to render her life unworthwhile, no child's welfare has been damaged. The affected child is born in the only state she can be born in and is likely to value her life as much as anyone else, albeit with physical and/or other complications that may require treatment. Medical sex selection does not 'save' anyone from living with a serious disorder. A different unaffected child is born as a result of PGD, rather than one individual being saved from this 'plight'. In most cases, using PGD for sex selection is not used to prevent serious harm to an identifiable individual but to allow prospective parents a chance to be a parent of the sort of child they wish to parent.
Thus, using PGD to identify an embryo's sex for medical reasons is not usually undertaken with the welfare of the child in mind. In most cases, we are not likely to affect the welfare of any individual child and we are not choosing between worthwhile lives. Instead, using PGD for medical reasons enables parents to have the child they want. The welfare of particular children is not affected by the choice between embryos, but the interests of the prospective parents may be better served if they are able to choose to be the parent of a child with less obstacles to overcome. The same is true with the benefits of using PGD to select sex for nonmedical reasons. In both cases parents wish to use PGD so that they can be a parent of a child with particular characteristics, and in both cases their choices do not, usually, have an impact on the welfare of the child-to-be.
In fact, taking this more widely, sex selection using PGD for non-medical reasons is in line with the general ethos of IVF and other assisted reproductive processes (such as surrogacy) more generally, which is to enable prospective parents to have a child with a particular characteristic -a genetic link to them. There are other options that would allow them to be a parent (such as adoption or sperm donation), but, in many cases, prospective parents prefer to have a child who is genetically related to one or both of them. It would, in fact, be more straightforward, cheaper and safer, for instance, to offer insemination with donated sperm instead of IVF using Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI), but we take the desire to have a genetically related child so seriously that we allow this use of resources and risk of some harm (all IVF involves some risk to the female partner as a result of hyperstimulation of the ovaries), 67 in order to allow individuals a chance of parenting a child with the characteristics they want. So, some IVF is about having a child of a particular kind, not for medical reasons but because the parents want a child who has particular characteristics (genetically linked to them). Although some may think that this genetic link is not important, and we have evidence from adoption that it is possible to bond and have fulfilling relationships without this genetic link, when it comes to being a parent and having the desired parent-child relationship, this evidence does not change the fact that for many this link is important and will remain a relevant factor when they consider their reproductive choices. This is comparable with the case of sex selection for non-medical reasons. We can explain to people that we think that the sex of their child should not be important and that they should be prepared to parent a child of either gender, but this is unlikely to change their desire for a child of a particular sex.
In general, assisted reproduction allows individuals to parent the children they wish to including choosing the characteristics of those children. As the Department of Health has acknowledged, other forms of gamete and embryo selection are well-established and accepted within, for example, donor insemination, where the physical characteristics of the donor are selected so that any resulting child may resemble those receiving treatment. 68 Within this general context of enabling choice regarding the children we can be parents to, sex selection for non-medical reasons does not seem so different in character or cost benefit analysis to that of other more generally acceptable assisted reproduction procedures. Given this, if the harm principle is to be used to justify the prohibition on non-medical sex selection then some other 67 HFEA, 'IVF -The Risks' (2014) <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/ivf-side-effects.html> accessed 17/11/15. 68 DH, above n 27, para 2.39.
kind of harm must be evoked. Might sex selection for non-medical reasons cause serious harm to society?
Serious harm to society
In one of the HFE Bill debates in the House of Lords, Baroness Williams said that:
There is so much at stake -so much money -in people, for example, being able to determine such things as the sex of their own child. Many noble Lords will know that the built-in hereditary preference for boys over girls has produced a surplus of what is estimated to be over 30 million young males in China, as against the women that they might one day marry. The social consequences of that are absolutely terrifying. They are the consequences of producing a warrior people -a warrior race if you like. We have to think about the social consequences.
69
She suggested that the refusal to allow sex selection was one of three 'fragile dikes' (the others being embryo destruction after 14 days and the prohibition on cloning), and that:
If we are to remain in a civilised world -one that fully accepts the huge benefits of science but recognises that there are limits to what people should do in using other people for certain purposes -then these dikes must hold. We need all the help we can get in doing that. 86 The range of opinions in the consultation on screening and selecting embryos was noted and it was concluded that there was a 'general desire' for the law to be clearer. 87 As part of this, Parliament was to define the limits or criteria regarding testing embryos, 88 and:
the Government is persuaded that sex selection for non-medical reasons within treatment services should be prohibited, including for "family balancing". This reflects, in part, the strength of public opinion on this matter that this should not be a
matter for choice open to potential parents'. had told them that the HFEA had 'found that largely very overwhelmingly the public in this country were opposed to sex selection for non-medical reasons' and that 'it's policy on sex selection has public support on the basis of this public consultation'. 91 The Joint Committee was, however, cautioned by the Royal Society about the use of apparent 'public opinion' in whether sex selection for family balancing purposes should be permitted, as recommended by the Committee', 143 and we discussed the most recent consultation at the start of this section.
It is clear that despite consistent and repeated claims of overwhelming public opinion against using PGD for non-medical reasons, the validity of these claims are tenuous, to say the least.
That these have been used to support a criminal prohibition on such use raises, we suggest, a number of issues which require consideration before 'public opinion' is used again as the basis for regulation.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH BASING REGULATION ON PUBLIC OPINION
In 2005 the Science and Technology Committee noted some of the concerns about how public opinions were used (and were seen to be used) as the basis for policy. 144 Some of the practical problems of conducting public consultations should be clear from the above. These include recruiting an appropriate number of participants, and ensuring that they have some understanding of the issues and their complexity prior to responding to questionnaires or being involved in discussions or interviews. Beyond this, we suggest that there are other problems with regulating on the basis of public opinion. As it appears that the majority of the respondents to the public consultations were against allowing PGD to be used to select an embryo on the basis of its sex for non-medical reasons, it might seem that allowing public opinion to influence regulation was fairly straightforward. But what if a consensus was not found? And if regulation is to be based on public opinion regarding non-medical sex selection, then why is such opinion not sought or the basis of regulation on other controversial and contested issues, such as embryo experimentation or funding fertility 143 Ibid. 144 House of Commons, n 24 above, paras 360-361.
services at all? This might be because even if we provided information about these issues in as balanced a way as possible, consensus is unlikely because of the very nature of the issues themselves. Indeed, a common characteristic of these issues is that they polarise debates.
But if public opinion is to be the foundation of regulation and public opinion does not provide us with a clear direction, then what are we to do? A compromise may be possible based on the results of public consultation, but it is difficult to understand what a true compromise, where both sides gain and/or loose in roughly equal amounts, on ethical issues such as these would look like. Indeed, it is difficult to see how a true compromise position can be achieved on ethical issues where views are polarised. Given this, how do, and should, we value the views of the people when disagreement on these issues is so divided?
Regardless of these concerns, the HFEA's policy on not using PGD to select sex for nonmedical reasons, and the subsequent incorporation of this into legislation, appears to have been, at the very least, influenced by (supposed) 'public' opinion on this issue. Indeed, the HFEA stated that:
By itself this finding [of widespread hostility to permitting sex selection for nonmedical reasons] is not decisive; the fact that a proposed policy is widely held to be unacceptable does not show that it is wrong. But there would need to be substantial demonstrable benefits of such a policy if the state were to challenge the public consensus on this issue. In our view the likely benefit of permitting sex selection for non-medical reasons in the UK are at best debatable and certainly not great enough to sustain a policy to which the great majority of the public are strongly opposed. The argument appears to be that while there may not be evidence that using PGD to select an embryo of a particular sex for non-medical reasons harms the child who will be born or their siblings (and so is morally wrong), the benefits of permitting such use is similarly limited.
This quote suggests that the HFEA weighed the harms that may be accrued by offending the public, whatever they might be, against the benefits that may follow from allowing parents to select embryos of a particular sex for non-medical reasons, and determined that the former outweighed the latter. However, as we have discussed in Part IIIA, when the benefits of using PGD for non-medical sex selection are examined, we see that they are, in fact, similar to those of using it for medical reasons and also for other assisted reproductive procedures, including IVF. This is because they all allow would-be parents the chance of having a child with characteristics they desire, whether that be a child they are genetically connected to, or one without a particular condition, or a child of a particular sex.
In the Science and Technology Committee's report the fact that the validity of the data gathered by the HFEA in support of its conclusions on sex selection had been questioned was noted, but it was said that:
even if the HFEA exaggerates the public's hostility to sex selection for social reasons,
we have little reason to doubt that a majority of the British public oppose it. Professor
Tom Shakespeare from Newcastle University has provided confirmation of this from his own research. Nevertheless, we do not 'see this as adequate grounds for prohibition'. 
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If we rely on public opinion in policy making then we must accept that many of those who respond to public consultations are likely to provide an intuitive 'gut' reaction to the issue.
Such reactions may be based on false information, prejudice and fear. They may also be inconsistent with some of their other views and, therefore, difficult to defend or justify. The policy which has consistently been said to be based on fear harm, the idea that the benefits of such selection are significant enough to outweigh these unsubstantiated harms, and that this position is supported by public opinion. Although the Science and Technology Committee shone a spotlight on the fallacies of this position, this was ignored by a Government seemingly convinced of the merits and popularity of stance.
Using public opinion to guide regulation is difficult and it is hard to formulate questions that do not lead opinion in one direction or another. Using public opinion as the basis for regulation may result in contradictory regulation or regulation that is inconsistent and unstable and it may need frequent updating. Public opinion changes over time as social norms evolve and as the public becomes more familiar with, and, possibly, more accepting of certain practices. Relying on public opinion for guidance on regulation is, at the very least, practically problematic. As a result, there are few calls for regulation to be informed in this way. The classic example here is that although the majority of respondents to polls are in favour of capital punishment for some crimes, there has never been a serious attempt to allow public opinion to influence the legal stance on this form of punishment in England and Wales. 152 While public opinion should not be dismissed, it is difficult to see why public opinion should be allowed such an influence in some situations, such as non-medical sex selection, but not in others. This is particularly troubling where this results in policy which is inconsistent with the approach to other comparable practices.
A reasonable and defendable position on sex selection is required and a consistent position is needed which is based on clear and explicit foundations. This will help guide us when we are faced with new challenges in this area. towards an assumption to treat unless there was evidence of serious harm to the resultant child. This is, essentially, an adoption of a classic harm principle approach to legislation that recognises the importance of reproductive autonomy and reproductive opportunities. In doing so, it moves away from the idea that children who are born into the only conditions they can be born into, and who are likely to value their lives as much as any of us, are harmed by this 'suboptimal' but still worthwhile existence.
But this general approach stops when we look at using PGD to identify the sex of embryos for non-medical reasons. Although it is admitted that there is no evidence that children born for these reasons will suffer serious harm, this practice is not only prohibited but is criminalised on the basis that there is not enough evidence of the benefits in order to outweigh the supposed public distaste for sex selection for these reasons. We suggest that it is a mistake to distinguish between selecting an embryo on the basis of its sex for nonmedical reasons from other assisted reproductive techniques because they are comparable.
Medical sex selection, and IVF more generally, are often used to create a child with particular characteristics, such as one who is free of a sex linked disorder or who is genetically related to their parents. The motivation, in most cases, is to be a parent to a child with these particular characteristics, rather than pure concern for the welfare of the resultant child.
153 'The Act requires the HFEA to maintain a statement of the general principles that we consider should be followed in carrying out activities covered by the Act. The principles: summarise the key behaviours and outcomes we expect licensed centres to demonstrate, and communicate the areas of compliance we regard as important. The principles inform every part of the Code. Each guidance note is linked to one or more of the principles and they should be read together': HFEA, 'User Guide to the Code, Version 2' <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/333.html> accessed 17/11/15.
Indeed, in most cases, even in medical sex selection cases, the disorder that we are trying to avoid is not one that would 'blight' that child's life and make that life not worthwhile. We would expect a child who is born with most of these disorders to have a challenged but still worthwhile life, a life that they would be likely to value as much as the next child. Given this, it is not as easy to distinguish between using PGD to select embryos of a specific sex for medical and non-medical reasons as might first be presumed.
The 2008 Acts' amendments to the 1990 Act, in general, introduced a clear moral stance on the regulation of assisted reproduction, with an explicit foundation in the harm principle and a commitment to reproductive autonomy. Yet, non-medical sex selection was singled out for different treatment. As a result, we have a general approach to regulation which is based on reason, evidence and critical thinking about the issues in hand, with one issue treated differently without good reason. Here, the cry of 'it's what the public wants' has been used to endorse the prohibition on using PGD to select an embryo on the basis of its sex for nonmedical reasons only. The singling out of non-medical sex selection is both curious and indefensible. We hope that the use public opinion as the basis for regulation is carefully considered and that it remains the exception rather than the rule.
